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Abstract
This paper develops a market microstructure model with asymmetric information in order
to quantify the influence which practical decision rules have on asset prices. The users of
practical decision rules have incomplete information at their disposal and trade in a market
with both fully informed and uninformed investors, as well as with a competitive market
maker. The users of practical decision rules affect the periodical ask and bid prices in two
ways: by means of the precision of their information and through their share in the totality
of investors, respectively. The resulting bid-ask spread is positive and proportional to the c.p.
variation of these two influencing factors and is attributable to adverse selection costs.
Emanuela Trifan
Darmstadt University of Technology
Institute of Economics
Department of Applied Econometrics
Marktplatz 15
D-64283 Darmstadt
trifan@vwl.tu-darmstadt.de
http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/fb/fb1/vwl2/
*The study was made possible by a grant from the Federal German State of Hesse for the promotion of
young scientists. The author would like to thank Prof. Horst Entorf and those participating in the
internal seminars at the Department of Applied Economics at TU Darmstadt for their helpful
suggestions.
1 Introduction
For the last thirty years the academic community has been engaged in a considerable debate about the
efficiency of the financial markets, but has not yet reached a satisfactory conclusion. In the meantime,
the traders’ community has kept investing according to some well-known practical decision rules (such as
fundamental indicators, e.g. book-to-market values, price-earnings or price-cash-flows ratios, and techni-
cal patterns, respectively, derived from the systematical observation of the prices’ and trading volume’s
evolution). Despite the growing interest with regard to the application of such empirical methods, their
efficiency as a support in decision-making as well as their consequences still remain controversial and
unsatisfactory when investigated from a theoretical viewpoint.
Two different aspects help reveal the implications of the intensive use of practical decision rules
for asset prices: a qualitative one, derived from their informational accuracy, and a quantitative one,
generated through the proportion of their users to the entire pool of investors.
1.1 Overview
The purpose of this paper consists in quantifying the influence of these two factors on price formation.
Therefore, we model the transaction prices as functions of variables standing for the quality and the
quantity of the information derived by means of practical decision rules. Our simple framework accounts
for informational asymmetries among the market participants, acting as a driving force of the particular
price-setting process.
There are numerous related theoretical and empirical studies, investigating the implications of the
informational asymmetry on transaction prices. Some of the most recent approaches such as Garmaise
and Moskowitz (1999), Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001) or Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) attempt
to measure the spread component due to the informational asymmetry on account of real market data.
Other empirical results, e.g. those delivered by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) stress the significance
of information-based trading on the price evolution and on the expected returns. Garleanu and Pedersen
(2002) demonstrate theoretically the indirect effect of the spread component due to adverse selection on
the expected returns (i.e. this component generates distortions of the trade decisions).1 In conjunction
with our approach accounting for the two-fold influence of the supporters of the practical decision rules,
Easley and O’Hara (2001) show that both the quantity and the quality of the information affect asset
prices.2
The presentmodel focuses on the process of price formation, regarded as a result of the information,
actions and assessments of certain different categories of market participants, namely:
• the perfectly informed investors - a small group of fully rational traders delivering exact forecasts;
• the imperfectly informed investors - a separate category of not fully rational users of practical
decision rules;
• the noise traders - a group of irrational uninformed traders;
1For a summary of the previous empirical and theoretical research regarding the informational asymmetry and the
bid-ask spread, see Coughenour and Shastri (1999), Madhavan (2000) and Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2002).
2Due to the fact that private information increases the systematic risk of the asset holding, the investors expect higher
returns for the stocks characterized by more private information. The companies can thus reduce their capital costs by
influencing the quality and the quantity of the information released.
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• furthermore, one market maker undertakes the periodical price setting in a competitively manner,
and the subsequent execution of the orders of these three groups of investors, respectively.
At any moment of a given trade period investors can either buy or sell only one unit of a risky asset.
The value of this asset indirectly signalizes the current economic situation and is modelled as a binary
random variable (with two values: high and low). Due to the inability to directly observe the value of the
risky asset, traders try to estimate it by means of the available information. Accordingly, the periodical
decision to release buy or sell orders draws upon this information, which differs from one investor category
to the other. The market maker collects the forwarded orders and fixes the transaction prices (one for
the buy; the ask, the other for the sell; the bid), according to her own assessment regarding the value of
the risky asset.
This paper’s contribution to the better understanding of the influence of practical decision rules
on asset prices consists of several aspects. First, the users of such empirical methods are regarded as
imperfectly informed and modelled as a separate category of investors. Second, we emphasize and quantify
their twofold price impact: qualitatively (i.e. as the informational precision of the practical decision rules,
expressed as the probability of inferring informative signals which indeed correspond to the real economic
situation), and quantitatively (i.e. as the fraction of supporters of such empirical methods in respect
of the entire number of investors). The prices are therefore fixed on the basis of the market maker’s
estimation of the probability that the investors want to buy or sell. This assessment incorporates both
the probability of deciding to buy or to sell (ascribed to the informational precision), and the weight of
each category of investors.
Several interesting results emerge from the analysis. On the one hand, the adverse selection the
market maker is exposed to entails the appearance of a positive bid-ask spread, independent of the values
of the model variables. This result was previously demonstrated in other approaches and thus serves as
a confirmation of the model’s validity.
On the other hand, we concentrate on the influence of the users of practical decision rules on prices
and therefore on the bid-ask spread. In this context, we demonstrate that the more exact the information
generated by empirical decision rules is (other things being equal), the more unfavorable the transaction
terms for all traders in the market are (namely the higher the buy and the lower the sell price). The bid-ask
spread rises accordingly with an increasing speed. A higher fraction of imperfectly informed traders (other
things being equal) similarly sway the market maker to worsen the prices. For low proportions of the
users of empirical trading rules the bid-ask spread variation is not very sensitive to the modification of this
proportion, but it becomes extreme for high values of the fraction of these market participants. A possible
explanation for these c.p. effects relies on the adverse selection costs generated by the informational
asymmetry between the traders and the market maker. The latter protects herself against the losses from
trading with better informed counter-parties by increasing the bid-ask spread.
Finally, we undertake a comparison of the perceptions of the perfectly and imperfectly informed traders
with regard to the transaction prices. Deviations of price perception can determine real price distortions,
as demonstrated by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) and Easley and O’Hara (2001).3
We call the perception bias occurring for the users of practical decision rules ”misperception”. The
misperception can be expressed in two ways: by means of the assessments of the current economic
situation (when the users of practical decision rules derive the same signal as the benchmark, namely
the perfectly informed traders), and with the aid of the decision made in a given economic situation,
3Section 4.3 emphasizes the differences between the assumptions of De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990)
and this approach.
2
respectively. As expected, both specifications of misperception decrease with an increasing quality of
the information derived from the practical rules, but their variation takes different formes. A close
analysis of the potentially direct connection between the misperceptions and the prices could constitute
an interesting topic for further research.
1.2 Delimitation of the model
The concept of this approach relies on several related classical market microstructure models, such as
Glosten and Milgrom(1985), Kyle (1985) or Easley and O’Hara (1987), which explain the bid-ask spread
by means of the informational asymmetry dominating the market. There are nevertheless some differences
between these approaches and our model, as well as some other points which deserve to be mentioned.
In the present model, market orders are simultaneously (and not sequentially) released. Consequently,
investors do not learn by observing the contemporaneous actions of other agents and thus by trying to
infer the information underlying them. The periodical learning process can be ascribed only to collective
experience (consisting of past data), and (only for informed investors) to new information. The prices
reflect the new information on the basis of the assessment of the market maker concerning the economic
situation.
Furthermore, the risky asset does not exhibit a constant ”true” value, but merely a variable one, by
representing an indicator of the economic situation, which can fluctuate from one trading moment to
the other. Correspondingly, the perfectly informed investors do indeed receive new information in every
period. The other (myopic) agents do not consequently have the time and opportunity to deduce the
state of the world from the actions of the fully informed traders.
In addition, trading is structured in such a manner (cf. Kyle (1985)), that prices are fixed only after
the orders have been placed, so that these prices show no relevance for the actual investors’ decisions.
Because a free choice of the order size can result in multiple equilibria (either when this order size
varies discreetly, as in Easley and O’Hara (1987) or continuously, as in Kyle (1985)), our model further
allows only for a restricted trade size (of one unit per person and period) (as in Glosten and Milgrom
(1987).
Moreover, quite contrary to Kyle (1985), there is no group of agents exercising strategic influence on
the prices in the current approach. Accordingly, we cannot check for periodical interconnections between
the agents’ decisions and the prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the basic notations,
definitions and assumptions. Section 3 gives account of the most important trading steps, beginning with
a general description of the trading course and continuing for each trader category with the specification
of the trading rules, the formation of assessments with regard to the economic situation and finally the
calculation of expected earnings. Section 4 discusses the main results of the model, these being the
periodical price calculation and the influence of users of practical trading rules on the prices. The final
Section summarizes the most important conclusions and describes some possible extensions. The proof
of the main results and several graphics illustrating these are contained in the Appendix.
3
2 Variables and Assumptions
1. Trading takes place periodically between t = 1 and T .4 At T , the value of the risky asset5 is
disclosed to all market participants, who thus become equally informed.6
2. The agents trade one risky asset. Its value Vt is an indicator of the current economic situation,
and is supposed to exhibit either a positive, or a negative evolution from one trade moment to the
other. Consequently, Vt is modelled as a binary random variable with two possible values: high and
low Vt ∈ {VH , VL}.7 For simplicity, we further take VH = 1 and VL = 0.8
3. There are no budget constraints.9
4. There are three homogenous10 non-overlapping groups of investors g ∈ {II, PI,N} trading in the
market, namely:
• the perfectly informed investors (PI)11,
• the users of practical decision rules (II)12 and
• the noise traders (N);
• in addition there is only one competitive market maker (MM), with the principal task of
periodical price setting, in order to maintain a fair, orderly, liquid and efficient market.13
The probability that an investor belongs to a certain category, conditional on a high value of the
risky asset and on the common information14 at t, equals, in the view of the market maker, the
constant proportion of that category to the totality of investors: P (g|Vt = VH , ht−1) = pg = ng/n,
4We model the trade time discreetly. Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) analyze the continuous case, with
uninformed orders arriving stochastically at a constant exogenous intensity.
5See Assumption (2).
6We can assume that the whole trading period consists of many uninterrupted episodes of the form t = ¯1, T . These
correspond in practice to the trading days, months or years, naturally separated by intervening periods, which can be further
decomposed into smaller units. At the beginning (t = 0) and at the end (t = T ) of such an interval the agents dispose of
homogenous information. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (pp. 76-77) the trading also takes place between t = 1 and T0.
At T0 the value of the risky asset is publicly announced.
7Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 71) also allow for two possible values of the risky asset, but their definition differs from
the one given here.
8The benchmark value VL = (E[Vt|bad economic situation]) = 0 emphasizes the fact, that during a negative economic
development the risky asset is as good as worthless. In turn, VH can take any positive value. E.g. if the risky asset yields
a constant dividend D and the market participants consider its economic life-time to be infinite, then VH equals the time
series of the discounted dividends: VH = (E[Vt|good economic situation]) =
∑∞
i=1
D
(1+r)i
= D
r
, with r being the risk-free
interest rate.
9According to this assumption, the financial situation of the agents does not represent a restriction for the formulation
of their actions and hence for the periodical price calculation.
10The notion ”homogenous” refers here to informational homogeneity: all members of a group dispose at the same time
of the same information and interpret it in the same way.
11If we assume that private information plays a more important role in decision making than method-based information,
this first group of investors can be viewed as consisting of privately informed traders. In turn, if we bear in mind the
significance of herd behavior for choosing the proper action in a given economic situation, the best informed traders are
those who take account of the price movements caused by the conjoint action of other agents.
12This group can include both fundamental and technical analysts, as users of systematical practical methods for making
their decisions. The former concentrate on the calculus of different global, market or firm-specific indicators, while the
latter study the evolution of past prices and transaction volume.
13In financial market terminology there is no clear and unitary assignment of the attributes mentioned here to a certain
market participant. At the NYSE or AMEX they are entirely undertaken by the so called specialists, while the market
makers act more as brokers/dealers. On the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange the so called Amtlicher Kursmakler is
responsible for the price setting and maintaining of proper market conditions. In our view, the name ”market maker” best
reflects the principal task of such an agent, namely ”to make the market” (i.e. to bring together the investors’ demand and
supply).
14For the definition of common information see Assumption (7).
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so that pPI + pII + pN = 1.15 Furthermore, there are always some noise traders trading in the
market: pN > 0.16
5. All market participants are risk-neutral (i.e. their utility functions exhibit a linear evolution
subject to their wealth)17 and myopic (i.e. their trading horizon is restricted to one period).18
6. We make the following assumptions regarding the rationality of the agents’ behavior:19
• the perfectly informed investors act fully rationally (i.e. they form accurate expectations about
the economic situation on the basis of the available information);
• the users of practical decision rules behave not fully rationally (i.e. their decisions are based
upon their method-specific information signals, as long as these signals are in accordance with
the state of the economy at large 20; otherwise their information is of no further relevance for
their actions, and they trade randomly21);22
• the noise traders are, by contrast, irrational (because they do not act on new information and
accordingly form periodical expectations based only on past data.23
• the market maker reacts passively to the orders of the investors;24 she uses the Bayes rule to
formulate her assessments of the economic situation and thus to set prices.25
7. At every time t the market participants dispose of common information ht−1 ≡ {xi ∨ Xi; i =
¯1, t− 1} (with h0 = ∅), consisting of the sequence of past actions (xi) and of past prices (Xi)26.
8. According to their degree of information, the agents are grouped in two distinct categories:
15For analogous assumptions concerning a constant proportion of the informed investors see Copeland and Galai (1983)
(p. 1459) or Easley/O’Hara (1987) (p. 71-72). Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) (p. 821) estimate the fraction of the
informed investors in the US-market at about 17%. A ZEW survey (see Rebitzky (ZEW-2004), p. 3) points out the
fraction of the technical analysts in the German Foreign Exchange Market, to be approximatively 30%, while the share of
fundamentalists participating in trading is roughly 60%.
16As long as the number of active noise traders remains strictly positive, the market maker can compensate the losses
from doing business with informed agents by the gains from transactions with the uninformed ones. Otherwise, the excessive
and repeated losses resulting from buying or selling exclusively from or to the informed traders could cause a definitive
trade cessation. See Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 72).
17The risk-neutrality of the market maker is explicitly assumed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 77) or Easley and
O’Hara (1987) (p. 71).
18The term of ”myopia” is used here in the sense of short-term behavior. The agents do not account for the effects of
their actions on the prices of subsequent periods. Hence, their periodical trading decisions are independent. See O’Hara
(1995) (p. 132 and 157). The survey by Taylor and Allen (1992) (pp. 308-309) make the case for an appropriate application
of practical decision rules in a market with myopic investors. The practical use of technical trading rules is ascertained to
be greater for short-, than for long-term decisions. Brown and Jennings (1990) (p. 534) demonstrate furthermore, that the
technical analysis exhibits a certain value in a linear two-period rational expectations equilibrium of a market with myopic
investors.
19Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 77) assume that all investors are fully rational, i.e. they are expected utility-maximizers.
Uninformed investors, who trade at random, can be found in Kyle (1985) (p. 1315), Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman
(1996) (pp. 1408-1409) or Grammig, Schiereck and Theissen (2000) (p. 622).
20Information is not in accord with the economic situation in one of the following situations: either the signal is one and
the value of the risky asset low, or the signal is zero and the value high.
21Random trading refers to equal buy and sell probabilities.
22In fact, the users of practical decision rules estimate the current economic situation with the aid of the Bayes rule. See
Section 3.3. Even so, their behavior is not fully rational, because they do not always use the entire available information in
order to make their decisions.
23The trade reasons of these investors can be seen as exogenous (e.g. liquidity needs).
24According to Harris (2003) (pp. 278-279), market makers indeed behave in reality as passive traders, unable to control
the timing of their trades. Madhavan (2000) (p. 212) assumes a similar behavior.
25An analogous assumption is to be found in Easley and O’Hara (1987) (pp. 75-77).
26For the respective definitions of actions and prices see the Assumptions (9) respectively (8).
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informed and the uninformed.27 The perfectly informed investors and the users of practical decision
rules belong to the first group and derive periodically either a zero or a negative information signal
st ∈ {0, 1}.28 (It is also assumed that the informed investors receive an informative signal at every
trading moment.) The noise traders and the market maker are uninformed.29
• The perfectly informed traders deliver accurate forecasts, because they receive a positive signal,
when the value of the risky asset is high VH , and a zero-signal, in case of a low value VL ,
namely:30
P (sPIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1− P (sPIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1) ≡ 1
P (sPIt = 1|Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1− P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VL, ht−1) ≡ 0.
(1)
• The users of practical decision rules receive positive information at time t31, given the value
of the risky asset, with the following probabilities:32
qHIIt ≡ P (sIIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1− P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1)
qLIIt ≡ P (sIIt = 1|Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1− P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VL, ht−1).
(2)
27In this context, relevant information can be obtained by the investors as a result of systematical analysis of the market
data. Consequently, the periodical information of the market maker about the entire order flow cannot be viewed as relevant.
It can, in any case, be used by the market maker for ascertaining price-relevant parameters, as can be seen in Section 4.2,
footnote 61. In this case, the market maker herself disposes of the entire information available and acts according to our
view of rationality in a fully rational manner.
28We designate below st = 1 as a ”positive signal” and st = 0 as a ”zero-signal”.
29Most models act on the assumption of the existence of two groups of investors: the informed (often called ”sophisticated
investors” or ”rational traders”) and the uninformed (mostly designated as ”liquidity traders” or ”noise traders”). The
fundamentalists are mostly integrated into the first group, while the technical analysts are viewed as being more uninformed.
See De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (p. 706). In real market settings, Harris (2003) (pp. 226-235)
distinguishes among four categories of informed traders, i.e. ”value traders” (who use the entire available information
for ascertaining the fundamental value of the asset), ”news traders” (who only act upon new information), ”information-
oriented technical analysts” (who profit by identifying predictable price patterns) and ”arbitrageurs” (who speculate on
instruments, which are inconsistently priced relative to each other).
30In the reality perfectly informed investors are rarely to be met. Here, such an assumption serves the purpose of
simplifying the model structure and emphasizing the existence of an better informed group of investors (being thus viewed
as benchmark).
31In contrast to other market microstructure models, the users of practical decision rules (i.e. the technical or fundamental
analysts) are viewed here as informed traders, the reason being that these traders systematically derive new information,
availing of their own method. This would not be the case for the noise traders, who only dispose of the publicly available
information and make no efforts to obtain more information. However, we make no assumption about the precision of the
information of the users of practical decision rules and correspondingly about its capability to generate appropriate actions.
(In fact, we assume and model only the possibility of this information having some precision.) This should be reflected by
the prices and misperceptions (see Section 4).
In sustaining the assumption that practical decision rules (such as those delivered by the use of fundamental or technical
instruments) could offer valuable information, we can make some remarks. On the one hand, the fundamentalists are
usually supposed to gather useful information during the determination process of the so called fundamental value of the
risky asset. (This value represents an intrinsic value which is independent of the transitory market phenomena, being
thus often utilized as reference for the evaluation of price movements.) On the other hand, several approaches support
the relevance of technical information (as a combination of the past prices and volumes) or of some technical methods
(such as moving average) for obtaining positive excess returns in the stock and foreign exchange market. (Treynor and
Ferguson (1985), Brown and Jennings (1989) or Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) account from a theoretical point of view
for the rationality of the technical analysis and the effectiveness of using a price sequence instead of single prices. They also
emphasize the benefits of the combination of past prices and volumes for choosing optimal trading strategies. Using real
market data, Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992), Allen and Karjalainen (1995), Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997) or
Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) evaluate the success of different technical methods as basically positive.
32In Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 71) the signals of the market participants are informative with a given probability.
We assume that the information signals of the fundamental analysts rely on the fundamental value of the risky asset
Xft , derived from the analysis of the global, market and firm-specific situation (see Murphy (2000), p. 24), so that:
qHPIt = f(X−∞, ..., Xt−1, X
f
−∞, ..., X
f
t−1, ht−1) (and analogous for qLPIt). The technical analysis extracts information
from the past prices and volume (see Murphy (2000), p. 165), so that: qHIIt = f(X−∞, ..., Xt−1, U−∞, ..., Ut−1, ht−1)
(and analogous for qLIIt), with Ut the periodical volume (which further remains unconsidered).
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• The noise traders trade at random (i.e. with equal buy and sell probabilities in each economic
situation).33
• The market maker accommodates the buy and sell orders of the investors and executes them
at the quoted buy prices (ask XBt) and sell prices (bid XSt).34 The prices are competitively
set35, so that the market maker gains no profit from any of the buys and sells undertaken.36
The ask price normally exceeds the bid price by the amount of the so called bid-ask spread.
The spread should cover the order processing costs, the inventory costs and the costs of adverse
selection, that arise during trading37, and represents the only source of earnings for the market
maker. We expect a constant fraction of the spread to be responsible for the first two cost
elements. We also require that all transactions be processed by the market maker (i.e. there
is no direct trade between the investors).38
9. In order to characterize the trading alternatives of the different agents, we introduce the following
notations for the buy probability, conditional upon a high and a low value of the risky asset,
respectively:
ugt = P (xgt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1− P (xgt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1)
vgt = P (xgt = B|Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1− P (xgt = S|Vt = VL, ht−1),
(3)
with g ∈ {II, PI,N,MM}.
In every period all market participants trade once and only one unit of the risky asset.39 More-
over, they trade actively40, by either buying or selling the asset41, i.e. xgt ∈ {B,S} (with g ∈
{II, PI,N,MM}).
• The perfectly informed investors obtain a fully informative signal at every trade time. This fact
allows them to exactly recognize the economic situation and therefore to choose the appropriate
trade alternative.
33For an analogous assumption see Kyle (1985) (p. 1315).
34We assume, that all transactions take place at exactly the quoted prices. In reality, the dealers can treat some investors
preferentially, by offering them price reductions. See Harris (2003) (p. 281).
35The monopolistic power of the single market maker is constrained by her duty to set fair and efficient prices. This
analysis can therefore be viewed as a marginal case of the general situation with many competing market makers. Some
real markets (i.e. NYSE) do indeed function with only one market maker per traded asset. Even in such market settings
there are factors accounting for competition, such as: competing markets with lower bid-ask spreads, limit orders, other
specialists, floor traders, etc. See Demsetz (1968) (p. 43-44) or Harris (2003) (p. 298).
36The competitive price setting represents an application of the zero expected profit-condition. Accordingly, the prices
equal the expectations of the market maker regarding the value of the risky asset, conditional upon the available information.
See Copeland and Galai (1983) (p. 1462) and O’Hara (1995) (p. 146). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 79-81) and Easley
and O’Hara (1987) (p. 74) stress the zero expected profit-condition as well.
37See Stoll (1989) (p. 115) or Grammig, Schiereck and Theissen (2000) (p. 20-21).
38The modelled market functions hence as a quote-driven system, as defined in DeMarchi and Foucault (1998) (p. 36).
39The restrictions upon the order size and the trading frequency, respectively, should help avoid a premature trade
cessation. Otherwise, the perfectly informed traders could already trade at t = 1 as much as possible, thereby making the
price from the beginning fully informative and eliminating every trade incentive. While Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 76)
also assume a one-unit order size, Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 72) allow for its discreet variation. In turn, Kyle (1985) (p.
1317) models the order size (in an sequential auction-equilibrium) as a continuous normally distributed random variable.
40In contrast to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 76) or Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1986) (p. 1409) we do not
account for ”hold” as a third possible action, besides ”buy” and ”sell”. This is due to several assumptions which create the
premises for an active trade at every time, i.e. that both groups of informed investors periodically receive new information,
the noise traders are always active by trading at random and the market maker is supposed to accommodate the orders of
the agents.
41The buys and sells are thus independent.
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• The users of practical decision rules buy, if their method-based signal is positive and the
economic situation good (i.e. the value of the risky asset is high), and sell if they receive
a zero-signal and the economic evolution is bad (i.e. the value of the risky asset is low).
Otherwise, they trade at random, either buying or selling with the same probability (1/2).
• Because the noise traders do not dispose of new information, they trade in every period at
random, i.e. they buy or sell with the same probability (1/2), independent of the state of the
economy, such as: uNt = vNt = 1/2.
• The market maker calculates in every trade period the ask and bid prices on the basis of her
assessments regarding the economic situation. She is subsequently committed to fulfill all the
received investors’ orders at these prices.
Moreover, the investors are assumed to simultaneously hand on their orders to the market maker.42
Hence, they get no information about the contemporaneous actions of other agents.43 The prices
are determined only after the orders have been placed (namely on this basis) (see Section 3.1).44
Moreover, the investors remain anonym.45
10. At the time t all market participants are acquainted with the a-priori assessment pt−1 = P (Vt =
VH |ht−1), formulated on the basis of the common (i.e. past) information.46
3 The trading process
In this Section we discuss the trading steps and derive intermediary results important for the price
formation described in Section 4.
3.1 The structure of the trading process
In every trade period, the market participants perform the following two trading steps:47
• the investors:
42An analogous assumption is made by Kyle (1985) (p. 1315). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 78), Easley and O’Hara
(1987) (p. 73) or Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) (p. 811) model the trade sequentially, in a given (probabilistically)
succession of the investors. Back and Baruch (2003) (p. 447-448) demonstrate the equivalence of the Glosten and Milgrom’s
sequential equilibrium with Kyle’s continous equilibrium, for small order sizes and frequently uninformed transactions.
43In our approach, the investors cannot directly observe the actions of other market participants and are therefore unable
to form an opinion about the contemporaneous information of these other traders. Consequently, the learning takes place
exclusively on the basis of the collective experience and, in addition for the informed traders, by means of new information.
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) and Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) analyze the case with continuously
arriving uninformed orders, whereby the arrival succession is modelled as a stochastic Poisson-process.
44The contemporaneous prices thus remain unknown to the investors in the moment of choosing their actions. (The trading
rules rely consequently only on the available information and not on other price-based rules such as profit maximization.)
Because the single prices are not solely relevant, the analysis of the informative content of a price sequence (which is possible
in a context with strategic traders) could represent an interesting avenue of further research.
45The anonymity of investors and market transparency have been intensively studied in the attendant literature. See
the summaries of O’Hara (1995) (pp. 252-268) and Madhavan (2000) (pp. 236-241). The general conclusion stresses a less
acute adverse selection in transparent market settings, which determines lower bid-ask spreads, at least for some trader
categories.
46The a-priori assessment relies on the common information of the market at a given time and thus reflects the public
opinion. The moment t = 0 characterizes the original state before the beginning of trade. At that given time, all traders
are aware of the a-priori probability p0 = P (V1 = VH) = 1 − P (V1 = VL) of a high risky value at the begin of that
trade interval. This probability is influenced by the results of the previous trade intervals. (If the value of the asset was
high at the end of the previous interval, then VT = VH , p0 increases, otherwise it decreases.) During the coming trade
interval investors gather decision-relevant information (on the basis of the collective experience or also with the help of new
periodical information.
47Our trading structure is similar to Kyle (1985) (p. 1315-1316). By contrast, the investors act on the basis of previously
fixed prices in Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) (p. 811).
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◦ determine the optimal action xgt (with g ∈ {II, PI,N}), on the basis of the common and,
contingently, on the new information (whereby the latter applies only to the informed traders)
(see Section 3.2) and release the orders;
◦ update their assessments of the value of the risky asset Paktual,gt (with g ∈ {II, PI,N}) (see
Section 3.3);
• the market maker:
◦ updates her assessments with respect to the economic situation PBMMt and PSMMt (see
Section 3.3);
◦ ascertains the prices XBt and XSt (see Section 4.1);
◦ executes the orders of the investors;
• following (that means after the price calculation and disclosing), the investors can assess their
expected profits Ggt with the aid of Paktual,gt (with g ∈ {II, PI,N}) and the prices XBt, XSt (see
Section 3.4).
The price formation is based on the market makers’ assessments concerning the economic situation
during the respective trade period. These assessments rely on the probabilities the market maker ascer-
tains in the case of investors wanting to buy or to sell. Furthermore, the type of orders released depends
on the the group-specific decision rules. Accordingly, we differentiate several steps of price formation,
which will be presented in the following Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. In fact, only the assessments, actions
and profit expectations of the market maker are relevant for the price derivation. Actually, the corre-
sponding considerations and actions of the investors are responsible for the reactions of the market maker.
The following sections discuss the behavior of all market participants as a consequence.
Our main goal is to ascertain the price formulas subject to the variables of interest, namely qHIIt
respectively qLIIt (as an expression of the precision of the method-based information) and pII (the fraction
of the users of practical decision rules). Subsequently (in Section 4.2), we analyze the price movements
due to the c.p. variation of these factors.
3.2 The actions of the market participants
As we have already assumed under Hypothesis (9), each group of investors shapes its actions according
to different trading rules. From the viewpoint of the market maker, these rules can be summarized as
follows:
• the perfectly informed investors always buy if they receive positive information (which clearly sig-
nalizes a high value of the risky asset) and sell when the information is negative (because in this
case the risky value will certainly be low).
xPIt =
 B , if sPIt = 1 (≡ Vt = VH)S , if sPIt = 0 (≡ Vt = VL). (4)
Hence, the buy and sell probabilities in a good or a bad economic situation are computed as follows:
uPIt = P (xPIt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) = P (xPIt = B|sPIt = 1, ht−1) ≡ 1
vPIt = P (xPIt = B|Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1− P (xPIt = S|sPIt = 0, ht−1) ≡ 0.
(5)
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• the users of practical decision rules buy if the value of the risky asset is high and if they receive a
positive information signal, sell for a zero-signal and a bad state of the economy at large, and act
at random otherwise.
xIIt =

B , if sIIt = 1 and Vt = VH
S , if sIIt = 0 and Vt = VL
B ∨ S , otherwise.
(6)
Consequently, we have:
P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 1, Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1;
P (xIIt = S|sIIt = 1, Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1.
With the following notations:
P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 1, Vt = VL, ht−1) ≡ rL1IIt
P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 0, Vt = VH , ht−1) ≡ rH0IIt,
(7)
the probabilities uIIt and vIIt satisfy:
uIIt = P (xIIt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1)
= P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 1, Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (sIIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1)
+ P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 0, Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1)
= qHIIt + rH0IIt · (1− qHIIt);
vIIt = P (xIIt = B|Vt = VL, ht−1)
= P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 1, Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (sIIt = 1|Vt = VL, ht−1)
+ P (xIIt = B|sIIt = 0, Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VL, ht−1)
= rL1IIt · qLIIt.
According to Assumption (9), rH0IIt = rL1IIt = 1/2. This results in:
uIIt =
1+ qHIIt
2
vIIt =
qLIIt
2
.
(8)
The buy (uIIt) and sell (1− vIIt) probabilities during a good and bad economic situation, respec-
tively, depend linearly on the corresponding probabilities of a positive (qHIIt) and a zero information
(qLIIt), respectively.
• noise traders are ”blind” traders who always undertake an action at the prices set by the market
maker. Hence we have:
xNt =
 B , with P (xNt = B|ht−1)S , with P (xNt = S|ht−1). (9)
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According to Assumption (9), they act at random. This results in:
uNt = vNt =
1
2
. (10)
The noise traders consequently buy or sell with the same probability, independent of the economic
situation:
P (xNt = B|ht−1) = P (xNt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
+ P (xNt = B|Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (Vt = VL|ht−1)
= uNt · P (Vt = VH |ht−1) + vNt · [1− P (Vt = VH |ht−1)]
= 1/2 · pt−1 + 1/2 · [1− pt−1] = 1/2
P (xNt = S|ht−1) = P (xNt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
+ P (xNt = S|Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (Vt = VL|ht−1)
= (1− uNt) · pt−1 + (1− vNt) · [1− pt−1] = 1/2.
• themarket maker accommodates the investors’ orders and engages in their execution at two different
prices: the ask (which has to be payed by a buying investor) and the sell (for an investor wanting
to sell). Hence, she assesses the probabilities uMMt and vMMt, subject to the investors’ readiness
to buy in a given economic situation. From the market maker’s viewpoint uMMt and 1 − vMMt
represent the probabilities that buys (xt = B) and sells (xt = S), respectively, take place48, taking
into account the economic situation and the common information at the time of order assignment.49
uMMt = P (xt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1)
= P (xt = B|Vt = VH , g = II, ht−1) · P (g = II|Vt = VH , ht−1)
+ P (xt = B|Vt = VH , g = PI, ht−1) · P (g = PI|Vt = VH , ht−1)
+ P (xt = B|Vt = VH , g = N,ht−1) · P (g = II|Vt = VH , ht−1)
= uIIt · pII + uPIt · pPI + uNt · pN = uIIt · pII + pPI + uNt · (1− pPI − pII)
= (uIIt − 1/2) · pII + 1/2 · pPI + 1/2
vMMt = P (xt = B|Vt = VL, ht−1) = vIIt · pII + vPIt · pPI + vNt · pN
= vIIt · pII + vNt · (1− pPI − pII) = (vIIt − 1/2) · pII − 1/2 · pPI + 1/2.
The market maker, therefore, calculates the buy and sell probabilities uMMt and vMMt, respectively,
as weighted sums of the similar probabilities for each group of investors ugt and vgt, respectively
(with g ∈ {PI, II,N}). The weights are the particular proportions of each group to the totality
of investors pg. The independence of the investors’ buys and sells50 ensures the independence of
the market maker’s buys and sells: P (xt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1 − uMMt and P (xt = S|Vt =
VL, ht−1) = 1− vMMt.
48The notation is always made from the investors’ viewpoint. The market maker then executes the contrary action (i.e.
sell for xt = B and buy for xt = S).
49xt = B and xt = S do not therefore mean, that one certain investor buys and sells, respectively, but the possibility
that the market maker receives at t buy and sell orders, respectively.
50See Assumption (9), footnote 41.
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Considering the simplifying Assumption (9), we derive the buy probabilities as non-linear expres-
sions of the variables of interest qHIIt, qLIIt and pII :
uMMt =
qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1
2
vMMt =
(qLIIt − 1) · pII − pPI + 1
2
.
(11)
While both uMMt and vMMt remain linearly dependent on pPI , which is in fact a result of the
precision of the perfect information, a joint effect of the qualitative and quantitative factors appears
with regard to the users of practical decision rules.
3.3 Assessments of the market participants
In every trade period the agents form group-specific assessments of the risky value and update them
on the basis of the previous actions and prices, and also (only for the informed traders) of the new
information.51 Only the market maker’s assessments are of immediate interest for the price derivation.
In any case, we also derive the assessments of the investors, which further allow the calculation of their
profits and of the misperceptions (see Sections 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3).
• The perfectly informed investors provide perfect assessments of the value of the risky asset, by
means of the Bayes rule:
P1PIt = P (Vt = VH |sPIt = 1, ht−1)
=
P (sPIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (sPIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1) + P (sPIt = 1|Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (Vt = VL|ht−1)
=
1 · pt−1
1 · pt−1 + 0 · (1− pt−1)
P0PIt = P (Vt = VH |sPIt = 0, ht−1)
=
P (sPIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (sPIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1) + P (sPIt = 0|Vt = VL, ht−1) · P (Vt = VL|ht−1)
=
0 · pt−1
0 · pt−1 + 1 · (1− pt−1) .
Consequently we obtain:
P1PIt = 1
P0PIt = 0.
(12)
• The users of practical decision rules assess the value of the risky asset, also with the aid of the
Bayes rule:
P1IIt = P (Vt = VH |sIIt = 1, ht−1) = P (sIIt = 1|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (sIIt = 1|ht−1)
P0IIt = P (Vt = VH |sIIt = 0, ht−1) = P (sIIt = 0|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (sIIt = 0|ht−1) .
51These assessments could be just as well understood as beliefs or expectations about the economic situation at time t.
They reflect both past and new information and should be thus understood as a-posteriori probabilities, which mostly differ
from a-priori assessments. We prefer the term ”assessment” due to the fact that we work with probabilities and not with
random variables.
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Consequently, we obtain:
P1IIt =
qHIIt · pt−1
qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)
P0IIt =
(1− qHIIt) · pt−1
(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) .
(13)
This result points out the non-linear dependence of the method-based assessments of the informa-
tional precision (qHIIt and qLIIt) and of the a-priori assessment (pt−1).
• The assessments of the noise traders regarding the economic situation rely exclusively upon the
common information at t:
PNt = P (Vt = VH |ht−1) = pt−1. (14)
• The market maker assesses the economic situation starting from the aggregate investors’ demand.
She does not necessarily include the number of received buy or sell orders in her calculations52, but
ascertains the probability that such orders are carried out.
PBMMt = P (Vt = VH |xt = B, ht−1) = P (xt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xt = B|ht−1) ,
if the investors buy from the market maker
PSMMt = P (Vt = VH |xt = S, ht−1) = P (xt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xt = S|ht−1) ,
if the investors sell to the market maker.
We further obtain:
PBMMt =
uMMt · pt−1
uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1)
PSMMt =
(1− uMMt) · pt−1
(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1) .
(15)
The assessments of the market maker regarding the economic situation constitute a combination of
past information (as reflected in the a-priori assessment pt−1) and the probabilities of the contem-
poraneous actions of the investors (as illustrated by the probabilities uMMt and vMMt).
It would be desirable to represent the assessments of the market maker as functions of the variables
of interest: qHIIt, qLIIt and pII . Therefore, we introduce the formulas (11) derived in Section 3.2
for uMMt and vMMt:
PBMMt =
[uIIt · pII + pPI + uNt · pN ] · pt−1
[uIIt · pII + pPI + uNt · pN ] · pt−1 + [vIIt · pII + vNt · pN ] · (1− pt−1)
PSMMt =
[(1− uIIt) · pII + (1− uNt) · pN ] · pt−1
[(1− uIIt) · pII + (1− uNt) · pN ] · pt−1 + [(1− vIIt) · pII + pPI + (1− vNt) · pN ] · (1− pt−1) .
Under Assumption (9) (that uNt = vNt = 1/2) the calculation simplifies to:
PBMMt =
[2uIIt · pII + 2pPI + pN ] · pt−1
[2uIIt · pII + 2pPI + pN ] · pt−1 + [2vIIt · pII + pN ] · (1− pt−1)
PSMMt =
[2(1− uIIt) · pII + pN ] · pt−1
[2(1− uIIt) · pII + pN ] · pt−1 + [2(1− vIIt) · pII + 2pPI + pN ] · (1− pt−1) .
52This would be possible using the proportion of the contemporaneous buy and sell orders (see Section 4.2, footnote 61).
The market maker could thus estimate the a-priori probability pt−1.
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But pII + pPI + pN = 1, so that:
PBMMt =
[(2uIIt − 1) · pII + pPI + 1] · pt−1
[(2uIIt − 1) · pII + pPI + 1] · pt−1 + [(2vIIt − 1) · pII − pPI + 1] · (1− pt−1)
PSMMt =
[(1− 2uIIt) · pII − pPI + 1] · pt−1
[(1− 2uIIt) · pII − pPI + 1] · pt−1 + [(1− 2vIIt) · pII + pPI + 1] · (1− pt−1) .
Using the results of Section 3.2, equations (8), regarding the probabilities uIIt and vIIt, the market
maker’s assessments PBMMt and PSMMt reduce to:
PBMMt =
[qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1] · pt−1
[qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1] · pt−1 + [(qLIIt − 1) · pII − pPI + 1] · (1− pt−1)
PSMMt =
[−qHIIt · pII − pPI + 1] · pt−1
[−qHIIt · pII − pPI + 1] · pt−1 + [(1− qLIIt) · pII + pPI + 1] · (1− pt−1) .
These expressions can be reformulated as follows:
PBMMt =
pt−1 · (qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)] · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1
PSMMt =
pt−1 · (−qHIIt · pII − pPI + 1)
[−qHIIt · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)] · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1 .
(16)
Hence, a complex non-linear relation arises between the assessments of the market maker and the
model variables (qHIIt, qLIIt, pII , pPI and pt−1).53
3.4 The expected profits
The periodically expected profits of each group of investors can be ascertained on the basis of the expected
risky value. The latter is expressed as:
E[Vt|xgt, ht−1] = VH · P (Vt = VH |xgt, ht−1) + VL · P (Vt = VL|xgt, ht−1),
with xgt ∈ {B,S} and g ∈ {II, PI,N,MM}.
We can simplify the calculus by using the values VH and VL from Assumption (2).
The investors are able to estimate their profits only after the market maker discloses the prices for
the period.54 In any case, they have to decide upon their actions and to place their orders before the
price is fixed (which, in fact, ensues only when orders are received by the market maker). Therefore, the
investors’ profit estimation does not influence the price formation. If an investor buys, she pays the ask
price and gets the asset; if she sells, the bid price is obtained and the asset disposed of. The market
maker performs exactly the opposite actions.
• The perfectly informed investors form accurate expectations about the value of the risky asset:
E[Vt|xPIt = B, ht−1] = 1 · 1 + 0 · 0 = 1
E[Vt|xPIt = S, ht−1] = 1 · 0 + 0 · 1 = 0.
In so doing, they earn the highest profits:
GPIt =
 E[Vt|xPIt = B, ht−1]−XBt = 1−XBt , if xPIt = BXSt − E[Vt|xPIt = S, ht−1] = XSt , if xPIt = S. (17)
53According to Harris (2003) (p. 288), in the real market settings the market maker has indeed to ascertain the degree
and the importance of the traders’ information.
54See Section 4.1 for the corresponding formulas.
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• The users of practical decision rules calculate the expected value of the risky asset by dint of the
Bayes rule:
P (Vt = VH |xIIt = B, ht−1) = P (xIIt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xIIt = B|ht−1)
=
uIIt · pt−1
uIIt · pt−1 + vIIt · (1− pt−1) = 1− P (Vt = VL|xIIt = B, ht−1)
P (Vt = VH |xIIt = S, ht−1) = P (xIIt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xIIt = S|ht−1)
=
(1− uIIt) · pt−1
(1− uIIt) · pt−1 + (1− vIIt) · (1− pt−1) = 1− P (Vt = VL|xIIt = S, ht−1).
It results:
E[Vt|xIIt = B, ht−1] = uIIt · pt−1
uIIt · pt−1 + vIIt · (1− pt−1)
E[Vt|xIIt = S, ht−1] = (1− uIIt) · pt−1(1− uIIt) · pt−1 + (1− vIIt) · (1− pt−1) .
They expect the following profits for a buy and a sell, respectively:
GIIt =
 E[Vt|xIIt = B, ht−1]−XBt , if xIIt = BXSt − E[Vt|xIIt = S, ht−1] , if xIIt = S
=

uIIt · pt−1
uIIt · pt−1 + vIIt · (1− pt−1) −XBt , if xIIt = B
XSt − (1− uIIt) · pt−1(1− uIIt) · pt−1 + (1− vIIt) · (1− pt−1) , if xIIt = S.
Considering the simplifying formulas (8) derived in Section 3.2, we express the profits of the im-
perfectly informed traders in the following form:
GIIt =

(1+ qHIIt) · pt−1
(1+ qHIIt) · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1) −XBt , if xIIt = B
XSt − (1− qHIIt) · pt−1(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (2− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) , if xIIt = S.
(18)
• Having no new information at their disposal, noise traders behave in a manner similar to members
of general public, being only aware of past market evolution:
P (Vt = VH |xNt = B, ht−1) = P (xNt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xNt = B|ht−1)
=
1/2 · pt−1
1/2
= pt−1 = 1− P (Vt = VL|xNt = B, ht−1)
P (Vt = VH |xNt = S, ht−1) = P (xNt = S|Vt = VH , ht−1) · P (Vt = VH |ht−1)
P (xNt = S|ht−1)
=
1/2 · pt−1
1/2
= pt−1 = 1− P (Vt = VL|xNt = S, ht−1).
Consequently, we obtain:
E[Vt|xNt = B, ht−1] = pt−1
E[Vt|xNt = S, ht−1] = pt−1.
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The action undertaken has no influence on the expectations of the noise traders.
Their profits simplify to:
GNt =
 E[Vt|xNt = B, ht−1]−XBt = pt−1 −XBt , if xt = BXSt − E[Vt|xNt = S, ht−1] = XSt − pt−1 , if xt = S. (19)
• The profit estimation in the case of the market maker results analogously:
GMMt =
 −PBMMt +XBt , if xgt = B−XSt +PSMMt , if xgt = S, (20)
with g = {II, PI,N}.
This expression can be reformulated subject to the variables of interest qHIIt, qLIIt and pII , by
means of the formulas (16) for the assessments PBMMt and PSMMt derived in Section 3.3.55
4 Results
The assumptions and the intermediary results derived in the previous section allow us to compute the
price formulas and subsequently analyze the influence of users of practical decision rules on prices.
4.1 Price formation
According to Assumption (8), the market maker fixes the periodical ask and bid price competitively, i.e.
making no profits from accommodating the buy and sell orders received. The prices should thus equal the
expected values of the risky asset56, conditional on the market maker’s current information (consisting
of the common information and the contemporaneous action57).
• The ask price
The buy price relies on the assessments of the market maker with regard to a good economic
situation, assuming that the investors want to buy.
GBMMt = 0 ⇒ XBt = E[Vt|xt = B, ht−1] = PBMMt,
More precisely, the ask satisfies:
XBt =
qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + pt−1 · pPI + pt−1
[qHIIt · pt−1 − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)] · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1 . (21)
• The bid price
The sell price reflects the assessments of the market maker with regard to a bad economic situation,
if the investors want to sell.
GSMMt = 0 ⇒ XSt = E[Vt|xt = S, ht−1] = PSMMt.
55See the price formulas from Section 4.1.
56Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 79) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 76) make similar inferences, while Kyle (1985)
(p. 1316) and Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) (p. 1408) use exactly the same calculation method.
57The contemporaneous action consists of a buy for the determination of the ask prices, and of a sell in the case of the
bid price, respectively.
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More precisely, the bid satisfies:
XSt =
−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − pt−1 · pPI + pt−1
[−qHIIt · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)] · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1 . (22)
The ask and bid prices thus represent non-linear functions of the informational precision (revealed by
qHIIt and qHIIt) and of the proportion of users of practical decision rules (expressed as pII).
The price formation process is characterized by a double price setting in every trade period (i.e. the
market maker simultaneously sets one buy price and another different sell price). The difference between
the two prices represents the bid-ask spread, expressed as:
St = XBt −XSt
=
2pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · [pII · (1+ qHIIt − qLIIt) + 2pPI]
1− [qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI]2 . (23)
With regard to the bid-ask spread we formulate the following statement:
Proposition 1.: The bid-ask spread is always positive.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note: Both the ask and bid prices take values in the interval [0, 1], because they result directly from
the probabilities PBMMt and PBMMt, respectively. Considering Proposition 1., the bid-ask spread moves
between a minimal value of 0 and a maximal value of 1.
The formation of a positive bid-ask spread cannot be accounted for by order processing or inventory
costs (which are kept constant, according to Assumption (8)). The only remaining explanation is to be
found in the adverse selection costs the market maker has to pay to an increased extent when trading
with better informed agents. She tries to protect herself against losses from such trade by augmenting the
ask and lowering the bid. These modified trade conditions affect all agents in the market, thus allowing
the market maker to recover her losses from the trade with the informed at the expense of the uninformed
traders).58 These ideas are summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary: The positive bid-ask spread of a given trade period is the result of the market makers’ reaction
to the adverse selection problem generated by the informational asymmetries present in the market.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The bid-ask spread expansion as a consequence of the increasing adverse selection is consistent with the
evidence provided by other authors.59 Our result (as expressed in the Corollary) confirms this conclusion
and speaks for the model’s validity.
58See Kyle (1985) (p. 1316) and O’Hara (1995) (p. 54). In the original interpretation of Akerlof (1970), the adverse
selection points to the following problem: when buyers cannot precisely infer the quality of the products in a market, the
average quality of the entire supply deteriorates. Accordingly, if the market maker in our model cannot accurately evaluate
the information degree of her counter-parties, the transaction terms worsen for all traders.
59See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (pp. 89-91), Kyle (1985) (pp. 1319-1320, 1322-1323 and 1327-1328), Easley and
O’Hara (1987) (pp. 80-81) or Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) (pp. 1411-1412). Glosten and Harris (1988) (pp.
135 and 140) emphasize the importance of the adverse selection spread component in comparison to the inventory costs.
While the inventory effects on the bid-ask spread are transitory, the influence of the adverse selection exhibits a permanent
character (p. 131). Moreover, Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001) (pp. 20-21) show that the adverse selection decreases
with an increasing number of market makers trading an asset. This should draw attention to the increased danger of the
informational asymmetry in markets with only one market maker per asset.
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4.2 The influence of users of practical decision rules on prices
In order to examine the price variation subject to the variables of interest (i.e. qHIIt, qLIIt and pII), we
make several further remarks and assumptions:
• The probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt (that the users of practical trading rules receive a positive signal
in a good, and in a bad economic situation, respectively) can be considered independent.60
• (11) Assumption: The proportion of the perfectly informed traders pPI is constant.
• (12) Assumption: The market maker keeps the a-priori assessment pt−1 constant in every period
(i.e. at the level p0).61
As a direct consequence of these assumptions, the market makers’ assessments PBMMt and PSMMt
and therefore the transaction prices XBt and XSt will be governed by three variables only, namely the
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the users of practical decision rules: qHIIt, qLIIt and pII .
Both hypothesized effects of the supporters of empirical methods are thus readily identifiable: the
probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt refer to an influence by means of informational precision, while pII point
to a quantitative aspect, induced by the proportion of these traders to the totality of investors in the
market. The following statement summarizes the implications of the c.p. variation of these two factors
for the ask and bid prices (if the market maker regards the users of practical decision rules as informed):
Proposition 2.: A c.p. intensification of method-based trade (either on the basis of more precise informa-
tion or by means of an increased fraction of the users of practical decision rules) causes the deterioration
of trading terms for all market participants (i.e. an augmentation of the ask price and a diminution of
the bid price).
A possible explanation for the emerging spread fluctuation is provided by the informational asymme-
try between the investors and the market maker. According to Assumption (9), the market maker is
unaware of the identity of a potential counter-party. She is acquainted only with the fact that doing
business with better informed agents generates losses.62 Consequently she faces an adverse selection
problem.63
We subsequently reformulate and then demonstrate Proposition 2. by means of several further con-
crete statements, focusing on the effects of the c.p. variation of each variable of interest (qHIIt, qLIIt and
pII , respectively).
• When the economy is in a good state, the accuracy of the method-based information depends pos-
itively on qHIIt. The effects of the c.p. variation of this probability on the prices are outlined in
60This assumption enables the analysis of the price movements generated by the c.p. variation of the probabilities qHIIt
and qLIIt.
61In reality the market maker can assess this a-priori probability on the basis of the received buy and sell orders. If bt
and at represent the fractions of the buy and of the sell orders, respectively, received at t (with at + bt = 1), the market
maker can equate the buy probability (independently of the economic situation) with bt, so that: P (xt = B|ht−1) = uMMt ·
pt−1+vMMt · (1−pt−1) = bt. The unknown probability pt−1 satisfies: pt−1 = bt−vMMtuMMt−vMMt =
2bt−(qLIIt−1)·pII+pPI−1
(qLIIt−qHIIt+1)·pII+2pPI .
Consequently, pt−1 depends on pII , qHIIt and qLIIt. The resulting endogenity of pt−1 notably complicates the analysis
and, consequently, will not be further considered.
62See Copeland and Galai (1983) (pp. 1461-1462), Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 73) or Madhavan (2000) (p. 216).
In our approach the market maker can can only evaluate the proportion of informed traders in the market by dint of the
variables pPI , pII , qHIIt and qLIIt.
63See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 82-84) and the Corollary of Proposition 1. in Section 4.1.
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the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1.: The c.p. variation of the probability qHIIt (that the users of practical deci-
sion rules deduce a positive signal in a good economic situation) determines a directly proportional
and concave variation of the ask price. In turn, the bid price runs inversely proportional, but is
additionally concave. Consequently, the bid-ask spread exhibits a positive dependency on this c.p.
variation, with a convex evolution only for sufficiently high values of qHIIt.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In other words, an increase in the probability qHIIt (other things being equal) causes the probability
PBMMt the market maker assesses for a buy to rise, while the sell probability in a good economic
situation PSMMt falls. The ask price XBt augments accordingly (at first faster, then more slowly),
while the bid price XSt diminishes (at first more slowly, then faster). Consequently, the bid-ask
spread St rises, but its increasing speed depends on the values of the model variables.64 The bid-ask
spread rises faster for higher values of informational precision (expressed by qHIIt).
The buy probability of the imperfectly informed traders during a positive economic development
increases c.p. with the probability of a positive signal. Consequently, the market maker counts
on an augmentation of the probability of making losses and safeguards by enhancing the bid-ask
spread. The rise speed of the spread increases c.p. more for a higher probability qHIIt, because the
market maker reacts more strongly as a result of her counter-parties being better informed.
Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix B illustrate the evolution of the ask and bid prices, as well as of
the spread, in the particular cases with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qLIIt = 0.4 and pII = 0.1,
respectively pII = 0.8.65 As stated in Proposition 2.1., the ask increases and the bid diminishes
in both situations considered. The corresponding curvatures are readily observable for a higher
fraction of the users of practical decision rules. The bid-ask spread runs convexly in the first case
(pII = 0.1). Even for quite small values of qHIIt, the curvature parameter α66 is not great enough
to change this evolution. In the second case (pII = 0.8), the bid-ask spread reaches an inflection
point.67 Moreover, the bid-ask spread is higher in the (second) case with more users of practical
decision rules. According to the Corollary of Proposition 1., this can rely on increased adverse
selection costs.
• The precision of the method-based information during a bad economic period is negatively related
to the probability qLIIt. The c.p. effect of this probability on the prices can be outlined as follows:
Proposition 2.2.: A c.p. increase in the probability qLIIt (that the users of practical decision
rules receive a positive signal, conditional upon a low value of the risky asset) causes a convex di-
minishment of the ask price and a convex augmentation of the bid price, respectively. Consequently,
the bid-ask spread falls. Its evolution is more probably convex for lower values of qLIIt.
64For a detailed description of the spread evolution see the proof of Proposition 2.1. in Appendix A.
65Mathematica 5.0 was used for generating the graphics.
66See the proof of Proposition 2.1. in Appendix A.
67If pII = 0.1, then α = 0.06 · qHIIt − 0.014. Consequently, we have α < 0, for qHIIt < 0.233. Even for the minimal
allowable value qHIIt = 0, α satisfies α · (3+α2)+[pPI +pII · (1−qLIIt)] · (1+3α2) = 0.068 ≥ 0. The spread is thus convex
for all values of qHIIt = 0. In the second situation (pII = 0.8), α = 0.48 · qHIIt− 0.182 and hence α < 0 for qHIIt < 0.379.
Even for a small value qHIIt = 0.1, we have α · (3 + α2) + [pPI + pII · (1 − qLIIt)] · (1 + 3α2) = −0.288 ≥ 0, revealing a
concave spread evolution. The bid-ask spread reaches thus an inflexion point for small values of the probability qHIIt.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
The increase of the probability qLIIt (other things being equal) causes a contrary movement of
prices. The buy probability PBMMt and, therefore, the ask XBt fall (at first faster, then more
slowly), while the sell probability PSMMt and the bid XSt rise (at first more slowly, then faster).
The bid-ask spread St decreases accordingly. Its variation speed depends on the values of the model
variables, the spread thus evolving convexly or reaching an inflexion point.68 The more precise the
information of the users of practical decision rules in a bad economic situation is (i.e. the lower the
probability qLIIt is), the faster the bid-ask spread varies.
An explanation for these movements is to be found in the fact that a positive signal during a
negative state of the economy at large contains practically no useful information, therefore causing
the users of practical decision rules to trade randomly. The market maker is thus confronted by
less well informed traders, this being all the more probable when their information tends to be
imprecise, causing the market maker to improve the trade terms for all agents as a consequence .
Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix B illustrate the evolution of the ask and bid prices, as well as of
the spread, in the particular cases with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qHIIt = 0.6 and pII = 0.1
and pII = 0.8, respectively. As was demonstrated in Proposition 2.2., the ask diminishes, the bid
increases and the bid-ask spread therefore decreases with the probability qLIIt. The curvatures
are distinct for a higher proportion of the imperfectly informed traders. For a small informational
precision (i.e. a high qLIIt), the curvature parameter α69 in both cases reaches values high enough
to turn the convex course into a concave one.70 Besides, the bid-ask spread takes higher values in
the (second) case with more users of practical decision rules. This fact confirms the increase of the
adverse selection costs for the market maker, as stated in the Corollary to Proposition 1.
• With regard to the influence of the fraction of imperfectly informed traders on the prices, we can
formulate the following statement:
Proposition 2.3.: The ask price depends positively and convexly on the c.p. variation of the
proportion of the users of practical decision rules pII , while the bid price exhibits a negative and
concave evolution. As a consequence, the bid-ask spread changes positively and convexly.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In other words, the increase in the proportion of users of practical decision rules pII (other things
being equal) determines the buy probability PBMMt to rise, and the sell probability PSMMt to fall.
This fact causes the increase in the ask price XBt (at first more slowly, then faster) and the decline
of the bid price XSt (also more slowly initially, subsequently faster). Consequently, the bid-ask
spread St rises with an increasing speed.
The evolutions of the bid-ask spread and the prices found are to be expected as a result of increased
68For a detailed description of the spread evolution see the proof of Proposition 2.2. in Appendix A.
69See the proof of Proposition 2.2. in Appendix A.
70For pII = 0.1 is α = 0.04 · qLIIt + 0.006. Consequently we have α > 0, for all qLIIt. For a high value of qLIIt = 0.9
α satisfies −α · (3 + α2) + [pPI + pII · qHIIt] · (1 + 3α2) = −0.015 ≤ 0. The bid-ask spread has then already reached the
inflexion point. In the second case (pII = 0.8), α = 0.32 · qLIIt − 0.022 and accordingly α > 0, for qLIIt > 0.069. For the
same high value of qLIIt = 0.9, it results −α · (3 + α2) + [pPI + pII · qHIIt] · (1 + 3α2) = −0.683 ≤ 0. The bid-ask spread
also reaches the inflexion point in this case.
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adverse selection costs, due to the augmentation of the fraction of informed traders.71 The more
users of practical decision rules trade in the market, the greater the danger of adverse selection for
the market maker is, so that every further rise in the proportion of this trader category substantially
accelerates the spread increase.
Figures 5 and 6 in Appendix B illustrate the evolution of the ask and bid prices, as well as of
the spread, in the particular cases with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qLIIt = 0.4 and qHIIt = 0.6,
respectively qHIIt = 0.8. According to Proposition 2.3., the ask increases, the bid decreases and
the bid-ask spread rises with the fraction pII . The curvatures are more observable for a higher
informational precision in a positive economic situation qHIIt.
Besides the univariate analysis we have performed so far, we have also investigated the bivariate par-
ticular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05 and qHIIt = 0.6, qLIIt = 0.4 and/or pII = 0.1. The results
confirm the hypothesis set forth in Proposition 2. (i.e. the more intensely the users of practical decision
rules trade, the worse the transaction terms for all market participants are). The increase in the ask and
the decrease in the bid are more extreme for the borderline cases with: qHIIt → 1 and pII → 1, respec-
tively, qLIIt → 0 and pII → 1, and qHIIt → 1 and qLIIt → 0, respectively. (See figures 7-9 in Appendix B.)
Furthermore, we derive from the price formulas two further global statements concerning price move-
ments and the influence of users of practical decision rules on prices.
• Proposition 3.: The case with fully incorrectly informed users of practical decision rules (qHIIt =
0, i.e. no positive signal during a good economic situation and 1 − qLIIt = 0, i.e. no zero-signal
for a low value of the risky asset) is equivalent to the case with no supporters of empirical methods
(pII = 0).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Due to the fact that the signals of the completely incorrectly informed users of practical decision
rules can hardly reflect the real economic situation, these traders act at random, just as the noise
traders do. The groups of investors trading in the market are thus reduced in both cases to the
following two: perfectly informed agents and noise traders.
The bid-ask spread remains further positive:
St =
4pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · pPI
1− p2PI · (1− pt−1)
,
because the market maker still has to protect herself against the fully informed agents.
• Another conclusion considers both extreme situations with pt−1 = 0 and pt−1 = 1.72
Proposition 4.: If the a-priori assessment of the market maker regarding the economic situa-
tion assumes extreme values (pt−1 = 0 or pt−1 = 1), the market maker sets the same prices for buy
71According to Assumption (11) (of a constant pPI), the increase in the fraction of users of practical decision rules
generates the augmentation of the ratio of informed to uninformed traders pII+pPI
pN
. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 89)
confirm the conclusion that the increase of this ratio can cause an enlargement of the bid-ask spread.
72Because these two cases lead to trivial results, we do not take them into consideration in connection with the previously
discussed influence of the users of practical decision rules on prices.
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and for sell, i.e. exactly in the amount of the value of the risky asset.
In both cases, the market maker is already in t − 1 as well as being perfectly informed about the
economic situation in t. This puts her in the position of being able to undertake buys and sells at
the ”right” prices (equal to the true value of the risky asset Vt).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Excluding the possibility of a good economic development in the next period (i.e. pt−1 = 0) is
equivalent to the market maker’s belief that the risky value during a bad period for the economy at
large equals zero VL = 0. She will consequently set the transaction prices at zero, thus having no
incentives for trading. But if the market maker is convinced of future positive economic development
(i.e. pt−1 = 1), both prices reach their maximal values: VH = 1.
4.3 The misperceptions of users of practical decision rules
In comparison to the the perception of the perfectly informed traders regarding the prices, the perception
of the users of practical decision rules, who receive only imperfect information, can only be biased.
Following De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), we denote such a perception distortion as
misperception.73
Trying to appropriately define the misperception of the supporters of empirical methods regarding
the asset prices, we distinguish two different aspects of possible interest: firstly, the perception of the real
economic situation, if the investors receive a certain information signal, and, secondly, the perception of
the appropriate action in a given state of the economy at large. We consequently express the misperception
in terms of these two aspects, taking the assessments and the actions of the perfectly informed traders
as a benchmark, following Assumption (8).
Our aim is to find out to what extent the same input (i.e. the same information signals, and the same
value of the risky asset, respectively) can generate different outputs (i.e. assessments and actions) of the
two categories of informed traders (i.e. perfectly and imperfectly informed). The reason is to be found
in a potentially stronger cumulate influence on the prices, due to more similar assessments and actions
of these two investor groups.
The misperception of the economic situation draws upon the differences in the assessments of the
imperfectly and perfectly informed investors when they receive the same information signal. We define
it differently with regard to a good, and a bad state of the economy at large, respectively:
ρVHIIt = P (Vt = VH |sPIt = 1, ht−1)− P (Vt = VH |sIIt = 1, ht−1)
= P1PIt − P1IIt = 1− P1IIt
ρVLIIt = P (Vt = VL|sPIt = 0, ht−1)− P (Vt = VL|sIIt = 0, ht−1)
= (1− P0PIt)− (1− P0IIt) = 1− (1− P0IIt) = P0IIt.
73The approach of De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (p. 708) discusses the misperception of the noise
traders (a category which includes the technical analysts as well, see p. 706) regarding the expected prices of the risky
asset. This misperception is modelled as a random variable. We define the misperception in connection with two central
elements of our model: the assessments of the not fully informed traders with regard to the economic situation, and their
actions in a given state of the economy, respectively.
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Falling back on the results (13) of Section 3.3, we obtain:
ρVHIIt = 1−
qHIIt · pt−1
qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)
ρVLIIt =
(1− qHIIt) · pt−1
(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) .
(24)
The misperception of the appropriate action is defined as the difference between the actions of the
imperfectly and perfectly informed investors in a given economic situation:
ρBIIt = P (xPIt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1)− P (xIIt = B|Vt = VH , ht−1) = 1− uIIt
ρSIIt = P (xPIt = S|Vt = VL, ht−1)− P (xIIt = S|Vt = VL, ht−1) = 1− (1− vIIt) = vIIt.
The results (8) from Section 3.2 help in obtaining the following linear expressions:
ρBIIt =
1− qHIIt
2
ρSIIt =
qLIIt
2
.
(25)
According to the previous calculation and to Assumptions (11) and (12), the two misperception forms can
be represented as functions of the two probabilities of interest (describing the informational accuracy of
the method-based signals): qHIIt and qLIIt. The buy misperception ρBIIt depends solely on the probability
of a positive signal. This is due to the fact that, in a good economic situation, only such signals can
generate the right action (namely buy) of the users of practical decision rules. Analogously, the sell
misperception ρSIIt depends only on the probability of a zero-signal in a bad state of the economy qLIIt.
The c.p. variation of the probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt, respectively, causes different movements of the
misperceptions, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.: The increased informational accuracy of the method-based signals (c.p. expressed
through the probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt in a good and a bad economic situation, respectively) deter-
mines an improvement of the perception of the users of practical decision rules in comparison to the
perception of the perfectly informed investors, both concerning their assessments and the appropriate ac-
tion. The single forms of misperception exhibit specific evolutions.
Two statements focussing on the c.p. variations of the probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt, respectively,
facilitate the more concrete formulation and the subsequent demonstration of Proposition 5..
• The following proposition outlines the effects of the c.p. variation of qHIIt on the misperceptions.
Proposition 5.1.: The c.p. variation of the probability qHIIt (that the users of practical deci-
sion rules obtain a positive information signal conditional upon a high value of the risky asset)
causes the decrease of the misperceptions regarding the economic situation. The evolution is convex
for the misperception concerning the good state of the economy ρVHIIt and concave for the one regard-
ing the bad economic development. The misperception of the appropriate action in a good economic
situation ρBIIt falls linearly with an increasing qHIIt, while the sell misperception ρ
S
IIt remains in-
dependent of this probability.
Proof: See Appendix A.
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In other words, a c.p. augmentation of the probability qHIIt generates an increase of the assessment
P1IIt regarding the high value of the risky asset, and, conversely, a decrease of the assessment P0IIt
concerning a low risky value. Accordingly, both misperceptions of the economic situation fall,
namely ρVHIIt initially faster, subsequently more slowly, and ρ
VL
IIt reciprocally, i.e. initially more
slowly, subsequently faster. We expect this result on account of an increased chance of the users
of practical decision rules delivering correct assessments when receiving more accurate information.
The decline of the buy misperception ρBIIt as a result of an increasing qHIIt is due to the fact that
a more precise method-based piece of information results more probably in an appropriate action.
• The c.p. variation of qLIIt causes related misperception movements, which are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5.2.: The misperception with regard to a good economic situation ρVHIIt depends c.p.
positively and concavely on the probability qLIIt (that the users of practical decision rules receive a
positive signal if the value of the risky asset is low), while the misperception concerning a poor state
of the economy at large ρVLIIt also exhibits a c.p. positive, but convexly relation to the probability
qLIIt. The sell misperception ρSIIt increases linearly with the c.p. augmentation of qLIIt, while the
buy misperception ρBIIt does not change.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Because an increase of qLIIt points to a less accurate method-based information, the assessments
and actions relying on such information are distorted all the more strongly. The variation speed
of ρVHIIt is initially higher and subsequently lower, and develops exactly in the opposite manner for
ρVLIIt remaining constant with regard to ρ
S
IIt.
Although we obviously expect a decline in misperception due to an improved accuracy of the method-
based information (as outlined in Proposition 5.), we should note the different evolutions of the single
misperception forms. Because the actions of the investors are directly based on their information, the
misperceptions of the right action ρBIIt and ρ
S
IIt depend linearly on the accuracy of the method-based
information (expressed through qHIIt and qLIIt). In respect of the assessments, a joint effect of the
contemporaneous and previous information arises (see Section 3.3), so that the misperceptions ρVHIIt and
ρVLIIt exhibit complex evolutions due to the c.p. variation of qHIIt and qLIIt, respectively. Although qHIIt
(qLIIt) refers only to a positive (negative) economic situation, the two probabilities influence both the
misperception regarding a good state of the economy ρVHIIt, and on the misperception concerning a low
value of the risky asset ρVLIIt. For a low informational accuracy (i.e. low values of qHIIt, and high values
of qLIIt, respectively), we stress a more sensitive variation of ρVHIIt. The variation speed of ρ
VL
IIt exhibits
an opposite evolution.
Both misperception forms indicate a distortion of the price perception by the users of practical decision
rules. This can be ascribed to the fact that both a positive signal in a good phase and the buy generated
by such a signal express an expected price increase in the coming period. Analogously, the method-based
signals with a zero-value, as well as the sells can be associated with an expected price fall. In keeping
with De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (p. 711) the misperception of the expected prices
generates real price distortions.74 Our results provide a starting point for a further and more detailed
analysis of the direct relation between prices and misperceptions.
74De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (p. 705f.) assume the existence of two groups of agents (the
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5 Conclusions
The results of our approach can be summarized as follows:
• The informational asymmetry in a market with one market maker, perfectly informed investors,
imperfectly informed users of practical decision rules and uninformed noise traders affects the market
prices by generating a positive bid-ask spread. (Proposition 1. and the Corollary demonstrate this
result.)
• The c.p. intensification of the method-based trade (either on the basis of a higher informational
accuracy, or by means of an increased proportion of the users of practical decision rules) determines
the intensification of the adverse selection and hence a degradation of the general transaction terms.
(This conclusion is demonstrated in Proposition 2..)
• The biased price perception of the users of practical decision rules in comparison to the perfectly
informed traders is expressed twofold: with respect to the economic situation given a certain infor-
mation signal, and regarding the appropriate action in a given state of the economy at large. As
expected, the distortion (called misperceptions) is lower for a higher accuracy of the method-based
information. The single misperception-forms, however, exhibit different curvatures (i.e. non-linear
for the misperception of the economic situation and linear in the case of the appropriate action).
(This results from Proposition 5.)
The model provides further insight into the microstructure of the financial markets, explicitly consid-
ering the influence of the users of practical decision rules on the prices. In order to quantify this influence
by modelling the price formation process, we make several simplifying assumptions, which, on the one
hand, serve to clarify our conclusions, but, on the other hand, fail to give full account of the complexity
of the processes described in comparison to the real phenomena.
The model can be extended to incorporate variable order sizes.75 The hypothesized existence of
perfectly informed traders can be ruled out by allowing for an arbitrarily high order size (and maintaining
the other assumptions).76 Moreover, if the order size is variable, the model can account for the influence
of the trade volume.77 The unknown probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt could then be formulated conditional
upon the volume and thus rendered endogenous. Furthermore, the variable order size increases the risk
and the costs of the market makers’s inventory, hence affecting the prices.78
uninformed, short-term oriented noise traders and the informed, long-term oriented sophisticated investors), who trade a
risky asset, and model the misperception as a normally distributed random variable. They show that the misperception
of the noise traders regarding the expected prices generates a new risk form (the so called noise trader risk). The noise
traders unconsciously take this risk and are consequently rewarded in excess, i.e. the greater their misperception is. Easley
and O’Hara (2001) (p. 17) reach the same conclusion. They further demonstrate that private information determines the
appearance of a new risk type and therefore causes an increase of the expected returns by the noise traders, who take this
risk, because they cannot ascertain comprehensive information about the risky asset from the market price.
75Glosten and Harris (1988) (p. 135) outline the increased influence of adverse selection on the prices with the order
size. Easley and O’Hara (1987) (pp. 74-76) demonstrate the existence of two possible market equilibria, if the informed
investors have the choice between a large and a small order size: i.e. the one with informed investors transacting only small
orders, the other with informed investors placing both small and large orders. The most important surveys with regard
to the influence of the order size on prices and on the relation between the volume and the volatility are summarized in
Coughenour and Shastri (1999) (pp. 8-10).
76In this case, the information will be quickly (right from the first trade period, in fact) incorporated into the prices.
77Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) emphasize the role of the transaction volume for the learning process and thereby
for the price adjustment to the new information. Wang (1994) ascertains an indirectly proportional relation between the
volume and the informational asymmetry, taking into consideration the fact that the transaction volume can be important
especially in the case of technical analysts as users of practical decision rules, because their method is based upon the
combination of prices and volume.
78This results in the so called inventory component of the bid-ask spread. Coughenour and Shastri (1999) (pp. 2-5)
provide an overview of the surveys regarding the different spread components (due to adverse selection, inventory and order
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A further relevant development should consider more complex decision rules for the single categories
of investors (e.g. profit maximization).79 The investors could be allowed to issue both market and limit
orders.80
Another subject for future research concerns the question of market efficiency. Some of the classical
microstructure models 81 demonstrate that prices are martingales (i.e. that the information available in
the market at a certain moment in time can provide no information about future prices). An analogous
calculation using our approach provides the following result: The market we analyze can be weak-form
efficient only under the condition that the market maker formulates the same a-priori assessment pt−1
in every period. (See Appendix A for the proof.) Although this condition can be theoretically fulfilled
in the framework of the model, it will probably not be met in a real market setting.82 Furthermore, an
appropriate judgement of market efficiency necessitates a dynamic analysis of the price formation and
represents an interesting subject for future research.83
processing). The inventory models focus on this inventory spread component, as can be inferred from the summaries of
O’Hara (1995) (pp. 13-52), Madhavan (2000) (pp. 213-215) or Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2002) (pp. 6-7 and 15-16). The
models with strategic investors analyze the problem of variable order size in a market with adverse selection. See O’Hara
(1995), (p. 89-151) and Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2002) (p. 8-11, 16-18 and 22-26).
79We can, moreover, assume that the informed investors strategically choose the trading moment. See Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988).
80The market orders provide an execution at the market price, while the limit orders can be executed only up to a given
price limit (for a buy) or from a given price limit (for a sell). Because the limit orders remain active for several periods
(thus being anytime executable against a fresh market order at any given time), they compete with the prices fixed by the
market maker. See Madhavan (2000) (p. 229). According to O’Hara (1995) (p. 46-47) the execution probability of a limit
order affects the bid-ask spread.
81See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (p. 82-83) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) (p. 86-87).
82The market maker probably estimates pt−1 on the basis of the received orders. See Section 4.2, footnote 61.
83Fundamental decision rules, which draw upon both past and contemporaneous public information, retain their usefulness
in a weak-form efficient market. Within the framework of our model, even technical analysis could be considered a rational
support in decision making. There are several reasons in favor of this. First, common information consists only of past
prices and actions of the respective trading interval, but not of the information of previous intervals. Nevertheless, technical
analysts take into account such previous information (it influences their decisions through the probabilities qHIIt and qLIIt).
Concerning the real market settings, we should underline that the public availability of a particular piece of information
is not necessarily equivalent to its actual use in the process of decision making. Second, the particular combination of
different past data (such as prices and volumes) can create additional value for the different technical indicators. (Treynor
and Ferguson (1985) (p. 768) plead for the usefulness of past prices in a weak-form efficient setting for computing the
probability, that one investor receives private information before the market. Brown and Jennings (1990) (pp. 536-538)
demonstrate that the technical analysis extracts its value from using a price sequence in place of single prices. The efficiency
of the market depends within this framework on the definition adopted (pp. 541-542). Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994)
(pp. 171-172) stress the informative character of a sequence of prices and volumes, which makes technical analysis a natural
component of the learn process. In the approach of Kavajecz and Odders-White (2002) the technical analysis proves to be
a practical method for estimating the liquidity supplied on the limit order book.)
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A Appendix - Proofs
Proposition 1. - Proof:
XBt −XSt = (PBMMt − PSMMt)
=
uMMt · pt−1
uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1) −
(1− uMMt) · pt−1
(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1)
=
(uMMt − vMMt) · (1− pt−1)
[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1)] · [(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1)]
=
[(qHIIt − qLIIt + 1) · pII + 2pPI ] · (1− pt−1)
2[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1)] · [(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1)] .
Because both qHIIt, qLIIt, pII and pPI , and also uMMt, vMMt and pt−1 are probabilities (i.e. they take
values in the interval [0, 1]), there results:
XBt ≥ XSt.
Corollary - Proof:
If no informed investor trades in the market, i.e. pN = 1 (or pPI + pII = 0), the positive frac-
tions pPI = pII = 0. In this case, the prices refer only to past information and are thus equal:
XBt = XSt = pt−1. The bid-ask spread will accordingly be St = 0.
If there are either perfectly or imperfectly informed investors trading in the market, but no uninformed
traders (i.e. pN = 0, that means pPI + pII = 1), the bid-ask spread is positive. As long as pPI 6= 0, the
spread does not reach its maximal value, but only:
St =
[(qHIIt − qLIIt + 1) · pII + 2pPI ] · (1− pt−1)
2[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1)] · [(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1)] ≥ 0.
If only perfectly informed investors trade in the market, i.e. either [(pPI = 1) ∧ (pII = 0)] or [(pPI =
0) ∧ (pII = 1) ∧ (qHIIt = 1) ∧ (qLIIt = 0)], the buy price is maximal XBt = 1 and the sell price minimal
XSt = 0. The bid-ask spread reaches its maximal value (namely 1), too.84
We can consequently conclude that a greater informational asymmetry between the investors and the
market maker causes an increased bid-ask spread.
Proposition 2.1. - Proof:
The computation of the first two partial derivatives of the buy and sell prices with respect to the proba-
bility qHIIt provides the following results:
∂XBt
∂qHIIt
=
∂PBMMt
∂qHIIt
=
pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · pII · [1− pPI − pII · (1− qLIIt)]
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]2 .
Because 1− pPI − pII = pN > 0 and all variables take values in the interval [0, 1], we have:
∂XBt
∂qHIIt
≥ 0.
84Assumption (4) (i.e. pN > 0) excludes the realization of one of the latter two situations. We analyze them here only
with the purpose of revealing the importance of adverse selection costs.
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The denominator of the buy price (and at the same time of the assessment PBMMt) is however positive:
qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (2pt−1 − 1) · pPI + 1 = 2[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1− pt−1)] ≥ 0,
and accordingly, the second partial derivative negative:
∂2XBt
∂q2HIIt
=
∂2PBMMt
∂q2HIIt
=
−2p2t−1 · (1− pt−1) · p2II · [1− pPI − pII · (1− qLIIt)]
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]3 ≤ 0.
We can analogously compute the two partial derivatives for the sell price with regard to qHIIt:
∂XSt
∂qHIIt
=
∂PSMMt
∂qHIIt
=
−pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · pII · [(1− qLIIt) · pII + pPI + 1]
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]2
∂2XSt
∂q2HIIt
=
∂2PSMMt
∂q2HIIt
=
−2p2t−1 · (1− pt−1) · p2II · [(1− qLIIt) · pII + pPI + 1]
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]3 .
With all probabilities lying in the interval [0, 1] and
−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (2pt−1 − 1) · pPI + 1 =
= 2[(1− uMMt) · pt−1 + (1− vMMt) · (1− pt−1)] ≥ 0,
we obtain the following negative expressions:
∂XSt
∂qHIIt
≤ 0
∂2XSt
∂q2HIIt
≤ 0.
With the exception of the case when pt−1 ∈ {0, 1}, the prices do not reach any local extremal values.
By means of the previous formulas we can determine the sign of the partial derivatives of the bid-ask
spread with regard to the probability qHIIt:
∂St
∂qHIIt
=
∂XBt
∂qHIIt
− ∂XSt
∂qHIIt
≥ 0.
In order to obtain the second partial spread derivative:
∂2St
∂q2HIIt
=
∂2XBt
∂q2HIIt
− ∂
2XSt
∂q2HIIt
,
we introduce the following notation:
a ≡ qHIIt · pt−1 · pII
b ≡ (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)
c ≡ (1− 2pt−1) · pPI
α ≡ a− b− c.
(26)
In so doing we have:
∂2St
∂q2HIIt
=
4p2t−1 · (1− pt−1) · p2II
(1− α)3 · (1 + α)3 · {α · (3 + α
2) + [pPI + pII · (1− qLIIt)] · (1 + 3α2)},
with α = qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI .
The previously proved relations (see the computation of the price-derivatives) 1 − α ≥ 0 and 1 + α ≥ 0
result in:
• for α ≥ 0, is ∂
2St
∂q2HIIt
≥ 0;
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• for α < 0, has ∂
2St
∂q2HIIt
an inflection point in: −α · (3 + α2) = [pPI + pII · (1− qLIIt)] · (1 + 3α2).
◦ as long as −α · (3 + α2) ≤ [pPI + pII · (1− qLIIt)] · (1 + 3α2), we have ∂
2St
∂q2HIIt
≥ 0;
◦ for −α · (3 + α2) > [pPI + pII · (1− qLIIt)] · (1 + 3α2), we have ∂
2St
∂q2HIIt
≤ 0.
In other words, the bid-ask spread is concave, if and only if α is negative and small. Because α
is directly proportional to qHIIt, this condition is fulfilled only for sufficiently low values of the
informational accuracy qHIIt.
Moreover, α = 2[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1 − pt−1)] − 1 ; 2P (xt = B|ht−1) − 1. Accordingly, we
can give a second interpretation of the condition for a concave spread evolution: α reaches low
values (thus making the bid-ask spread turn to concave) for low buy probabilities (and high sell
probabilities, respectively), taking into account past information P (xt = B|ht−1).
The bid-ask spread consequently exhibits a variable variation speed, subject to the model parameters.
The condition for a convex spread evolution:
α ≥ 0 ≡ qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI ≥ 0
is more probably fulfilled the higher the probability qLIIt is (other things being equal).
Proposition 2.2. - Proof:
An analogous computation (as for the proof of Proposition 2.1.) results in:
∂XBt
∂qLIIt
=
∂PBMMt
∂qLIIt
=
(−pt−1) · (1− pt−1) · pII · (qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]2
∂2XBt
∂q2LIIt
=
∂2PBMMt
∂q2LIIt
=
2pt−1 · (1− pt−1)2 · p2II · (qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]3 .
Because all variables take values in the interval [0, 1] and the denominator of the second partial derivative
is positive (as previously demonstrated in the Proposition 2.1.), we have:
∂XBt
∂qLIIt
≤ 0
∂2XBt
∂q2LIIt
≥ 0.
If pt−1 takes no extreme values (0 or 1), there is no local minimal value of the buy price subject to qLIIt,
because qHIIt · pII + pPI + 1 > 0.
For the sell price we obtain:
∂XSt
∂qLIIt
=
∂PSMMt
∂qLIIt
=
pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · pII · (1− qHIIt · pII − pPI)
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]2
∂2XSt
∂q2LIIt
=
∂2PSMMt
∂q2LIIt
=
2pt−1 · (1− pt−1)2 · p2II · (1− qHIIt · pII − pPI)
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]3 .
Because all probabilities lie in the interval [0, 1], there results 0 ≤ qHIIt · pII ≤ pII and therewith
(1 − qHIIt · pII − pPI) ≥ (1 − pII − pPI) = pN ≥ 0. The two first partial derivatives are consequently
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positive:
∂XSt
∂qLIIt
≥ 0
∂2XSt
∂q2LIIt
≥ 0.
Because 1 − qHIIt · pII − pPI = pN + pII · (1 − qHIIt) and according to the Assumption (4) pN > 0,
the sell price exhibits no extreme value for pt−1 6= {0, 1}.
With regard to the spread evolution subject to the c.p. variation of the probability qLIIt, we have:
∂St
∂qLIIt
=
∂XBt
∂qLIIt
− ∂XSt
∂qLIIt
≤ 0.
For the computation of the second partial derivative we adopt the notations (26) from the proof of
Proposition 2.1. Accordingly, we have:
∂2St
∂q2LIIt
=
4pt−1 · (1− pt−1)2 · p2II
(1− α)3 · (1 + α)3 · {−α · (3 + α
2) + (pPI + pII · qHIIt) · (1 + 3α2)},
with α = qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI .
Because 1− α ≥ 0 and 1 + α ≥ 0 (i.e. −1 ≤ α ≤ 1), we obtain:
• for α ≤ 0, is ∂
2St
∂q2LIIt
≥ 0;
• for α > 0, has ∂
2St
∂q2LIIt
an inflection point in: α · (3 + α2) = (pPI + pII · qHIIt) · (1 + 3α2).
◦ as long as α · (3 + α2) ≤ (pPI + pII · qHIIt) · (1 + 3α2), is ∂
2St
∂q2LIIt
≥ 0;
◦ for α · (3 + α2) > (pPI − pII · qHIIt) · (1 + 3α2), in turn ∂
2St
∂q2LIIt
≤ 0.
Therefore, the bid-ask spread runs concavely only for a positive and sufficiently high α. By virtue
of the direct proportionality between α and qLIIt (other things being equal) the bid-ask spread
reaches the inflection point only for high values of qLIIt (as an inverse measure of the informational
accuracy).
By means of the relation α = 2[uMMt · pt−1 + vMMt · (1 − pt−1)] − 1 = 2P (xt = B|ht−1) − 1,
we can provide another interpretation of this result: the parameter α takes high positive values
(thus rendering the bid-ask spread concave) for high buy probabilities (and for low sell probabilities,
respectively), taking into account the past information P (xt = B|ht−1).
The bid-ask spread changes consequently with variable speed, subject to the model parameters. The
condition for a convex evolution:
α ≤ 0 ≡ qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII − (1− 2pt−1) · pPI ≥ 0
is all the more probably fulfilled for given values of the model variables, the lower the probability qLIIt
is.
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Proposition 2.3. - Proof:
Once again, we compute the two partial derivatives of the prices subject to pII :
∂XBt
∂pII
=
∂PBMMt
∂pII
=
pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · [qHIIt(1− pPI) + (1− qLIIt) · (1 + pPI)]
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (2pt−1 − 1) · pPI + 1]2
∂2XBt
∂p2II
=
∂2PBMMt
∂p2II
=
∂XBt
∂pII
· −2 · [−pt−1 · (1 + qHIIt − qLIIt)− (1− qLIIt)]
[qHIIt · pt−1 · pII − (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (2pt−1 − 1) · pPI + 1] .
Because all probabilities lie in the interval [0, 1] and the denominator of the second partial derivative is
positive (see the proof of Proposition 2.1), we have:
∂XBt
∂pII
≥ 0
∂2XBt
∂p2II
≥ 0.
Analogously, we ascertain:
∂XSt
∂pII
=
∂PSMMt
∂pII
=
pt−1 · (1− pt−1) · [−qHIIt · (1 + pPI)− (1− qLIIt) · (1− pPI)]
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1]2
∂2XSt
∂p2II
=
∂2PSMMt
∂p2II
=
∂XSt
∂pII
· −2 · [pt−1 · (1− qHIIt + qLIIt) + (1− qLIIt)]
[−qHIIt · pt−1 · pII + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1) · pII + (1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1] .
Because all probabilities take values in the interval [0, 1] and the denominator of the second partial
derivative is positive (see Proposition 2.1.), it results in:
∂XSt
∂pII
≤ 0
∂2XSt
∂p2II
≤ 0.
Moreover, the prices take no extreme values, as long as pt−1 6= {0, 1}.
The spread variation can be ascertained by means of the partial derivatives of the ask and bid prices:
∂St
∂pII
=
∂XBt
∂pII
− ∂XSt
∂pII
≥ 0
∂2St
∂p2II
=
∂2XBt
∂p2II
− ∂
2XSt
∂p2II
≥ 0.
Proposition 3. - Proof:
Both for [qHIIt = 0 and qLIIt = 1], and [pII = 0] the buy and sell prices are the same:
XBt =
pt−1 · (pPI + 1)
(2pt−1 − 1) · pPI + 1
XSt =
pt−1 · (−pPI + 1)
(1− 2pt−1) · pPI + 1 .
Proposition 4. - Proof:
For pt−1 = 0 we have: XBt = XSt = VL = 0, while for pt−1 = 1 it results in: XBt = XSt =
VH = 1.
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Proposition 5.1. - Proof:
Because
∂ρVHIIt
∂qHIIt
=
−qLIIt · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)]2 , we have:
∂ρVHIIt
∂qHIIt
≤ 0.
Furthermore:
∂2ρVHIIt
∂q2HIIt
=
2qLIIt · p2t−1 · (1− pt−1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)]3 ≥ 0.
Analogously we have:
∂ρVLIIt
∂qHIIt
=
−(1− qLIIt) · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)
[(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)]2 ≤ 0
∂2ρVLIIt
∂q2HIIt
=
−2(1− qLIIt) · p2t−1 · (1− pt−1)
[(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)]3 ≤ 0.
Excepting the extreme situations with pt−1 ∈ {0, 1}, the two misperceptions do not reach any extreme
values. The variation of the second misperception form (with regard to the appropriate action) can be
easily ascertained from the definition formulas.
Proposition 5.2. - Proof:
∂ρVHIIt
∂qLIIt
=
qHIIt · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)
[qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)]2 ≥ 0
∂2ρVHIIt
∂q2LIIt
=
−2qHIIt · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)2
[qHIIt · pt−1 + qLIIt · (1− pt−1)]3 ≤ 0
Analogously, we have:
∂ρVLIIt
∂qLIIt
=
(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)
[(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)]2 ≥ 0
∂2ρVLIIt
∂q2LIIt
=
2(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 · (1− pt−1)2
[(1− qHIIt) · pt−1 + (1− qLIIt) · (1− pt−1)]3 ≥ 0.
According to the definition the sell misperception ρSIIt depends positively and linearly on the c.p. varia-
tion of the probability qLIIt.
Section 5 - Proof:
According to the law of iterated expectations we obtain at t the following estimation of the prices at t+1:
E[Xt+1|ht] = E[E[Vt+1|ht+1]|ht] = E[Vt+1|ht] = VH · P (Vt+1 = VH |ht) + VL · P (Vt+1 = VL|ht) = pt.
The contemporaneous price takes the following value:
Xt = E[Vt|ht] = P (Vt = VH |ht).
Due to Assumption (9) (see footnote 41) (i.e. the independence of the buys and sells) and to the fact
that the market maker fixes the prices accounting only for the past information and the contemporaneous
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actions of the investors, there results:
P (Vt = VH |ht) = P (Vt = VH |xt = B ∨ S, ht−1) = P (Vt = VH , xt = B ∨ S|ht−1)
P (xt = B ∨ S|ht−1)
=
P (Vt = VH , xt = B|ht−1) + P (Vt = VH , xt = S|ht−1)
P (xt = B|ht−1) + P (xt = S|ht−1)
=
P (Vt = VH |xt = B, ht−1) · P (xt = B|ht−1) + P (Vt = VH |xt = S, ht−1) · P (xt = S|ht−1)
1
= uMMt · pt−1 + (1− uMMt) · pt−1 = pt−1,
that means: Xt = pt−1.
The prices are consequently martingales (i.e. E[Xt+1|ht] = Xt), only if pt = pt−1 = . . . = p0, i.e. for a
constant pt−1.
According to Assumption (10) (pt−1 = P (Vt = VH |ht−1)) and to the previous formulas (Xt = pt−1),
the prices are, however, based only upon past information. The market can therefore be only weak-form
efficient (and not semi-strong efficient, as in other approaches).
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B Appendix - Graphics
Figure 1: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a good economic situation, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qLIIt = 0.4 and pII = 0.1
Figure 2: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a good economic situation, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qLIIt = 0.4 and pII = 0.8
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Figure 3: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a bad economic situation, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qHIIt = 0.6 and pII = 0.1
Figure 4: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a bad economic situation, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qHIIt = 0.6 and pII = 0.8
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Figure 5: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the fraction of the users of practical decision
rules, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qHIIt = 0.6 and qLIIt = 0.4
Figure 6: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the fraction of the users of practical decision
rules, in the particular case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05, qHIIt = 0.8 and qLIIt = 0.4
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Figure 7: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information,
in the particular case with : pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05 and pII = 0.1
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Figure 8: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a good economic situation and to the fraction of the users or practical decision rules, in the particular
case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05 and qLIIt = 0.4
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Figure 9: The ask and bid price, and the spread, subject to the accuracy of the method-based information
in a bad economic situation and to the fraction of the users or practical decision rules, in the particular
case with: pt−1 = 0.6, pPI = 0.05 and qHIIt = 0.6
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